Strategic sector, generic funding
The EU has decided biotech is strategic and that public money should help build it. Our analysis of ten years of Horizon Europe grants finds that the design of instruments is not aligned with the way biotechnologies actually develop.
Horizon Europe is the EU’s €95.5 billion research and innovation programme and its single biggest instrument for turning science into industry. We looked at Horizon because it is the largest and because it reaches across the whole pipeline, from basic research to market. Public funding for biotech also runs through InvestEU, European structural funds, national programmes and soon the European Competitiveness Fund, so this is one part of a wider picture.
To understand the way Horizon grants impact the biotech firms that receive them, we used Horizon grant records linked to firm-level financial, ownership, and patent data from ORBIS, covering 2015 to 2025. We compared biotech against two groups we define for this analysis: digital tech (software and computing) and hard tech (hardware-based fields like chips, materials and clean energy).
The work comes in two briefs:
- The first asks what a typical biotech firm in receipt of Horizon funding looks like, how it compares to other deep tech sectors and what happens to the firm after a grant.
- The second looks inside biotech, at how the money splits between health and non-health firms to see how their scale-up and financial profiles differ.
The findings span two layers: the funding instruments, and the technology they are supporting development of. We find that Horizon’s instruments are calibrated to the average deep tech firm, which moves fairly directly from research to market, with a grant bridging the gap until private investors take over. This fits software better than biotech, where development challenges come later in the technology’s development – for instance, at the scaling-up stage of a bioprocess. Biotech also stays research-intensive for longer than its peers, and its capital needs more closely align with those of hard tech rather than software.
Alongside the instrument analysis, we set out how public money could support biotech better. Funding should build shared foundations the whole field can use, rather than only underwrite one firm’s plant or one project’s proof. Public funding could have particular leverage in making pilot-scale manufacturing capacity, pooling data on how biological processes behave at scale, and ensuring appropriate availability of a trained workforce.
The European Commission is now examining its levers to strengthen biotechnology, from the Bio-based Europe Alliance gathering offtake commitments to the Bioeconomy Investment Deployment Group on financing. This is the moment to confront the fit between those interventions and the way technologies mature.
Key findings
1
Biotech firms are structurally similar to digital firms but they develop like hard tech.
They are young and lean, matching digital firms on age, headcount and revenue, with a median revenue near €1.8 million against €5 million in hard tech. Their development, though, runs on long regulatory approvals, heavy capital and physical scale-up, which is how hard tech behaves. Horizon's instruments are calibrated to a generic deep tech average that fits neither profile well.
2
Grants lift revenue across deep tech, but in biotech the gain does not last.
In biotech the gain turns negative by years four to five, once the firm hits its next milestone and the grant is spent. The tickets are too small to reach the point where private investors could take over.
3
SMEs make up most of the biotech grantees but capture little of the money.
SMEs make up 85% of biotech firms in receipt of grants, but take only 22% of biotech funding, against 52% in digital tech and 35% in hard tech.
4
Grants raise revenue for independent SMEs, but not for those belonging to a corporate group.
Among biotech SMEs, independent firms grow revenue by about 24.7% after a grant, while corporate-group firms show no significant change. Corporate-group SMEs nonetheless receive 66% of SME funding.
5
Non-health biotech gets less fundamental research funding than health biotech.
Non-health biotech – the industrial and agricultural side rather than medicine – gets just 7.6% of its Horizon funding through Pillar I, the science excellence pillar, against 20.7% for health. Only 26.4% of non-health projects sit at early research stages, against 43.1% for health, and universities hold 42.1% of consortium places, against 50%.
6
Early-stage non-health biotech is funded thinly, and the grants it does get don’t show an effect.
Early-stage firms take 22.9% of non-health grant money against 37.1% for their health equivalents, and more than four in five never receive above €500,000. Unlike early-stage health firms, they show no measurable revenue gain. Whether that reflects grant size or a thinner surrounding ecosystem, our sample cannot settle.
Introduction
Europe’s biotech firms are working on the future in the most literal sense – developing the medicines, materials, tools, and platform technologies that will define the next generation of healthcare, agriculture, and industrial production. Most are small, young, and operating on ambition as much as capital, which is the nature of science-intensive sectors at the frontier. Translating science into commercial reality requires the innovation, capital, manufacturing capacity, and industrial know-how that larger firms bring. A healthy ecosystem needs both the disruptive energy of early-stage firms and the scale of established players.
As the EU Biotech Act takes shape and negotiations over the next Multiannual Financial Framework intensify, the question of how Europe directs public investment into its biotech ecosystem is both alive and consequential. Horizon Europe is the largest single lever available, so whether its instruments are well-matched to the biotech firms it is supporting determines whether that investment arrives where the sector needs it most.
A 2025 report, “Funding ideas not companies. Rethinking EU innovation policy from the bottom up”, gave reason to doubt that it does. Researchers at IEP@Bocconi and EconPol Europe linked roughly two-thirds of all Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe company grants from 2015 to 2025 to those firms’ organisational structure, financial performance and patents[1]. The headline finding was that recipient firms see a revenue increase of around 10%, but the effect fades within about three years, roughly the length of the grant itself[2]. The authors developed this finding in a VoxEU column that has circulated widely in the FP10 debate[3]. The column described Horizon funding as “a flash in the pan”, with the majority of money flowing to large, not particularly dynamic companies, some involved in hundreds of Horizon projects, rather than to the disruptive young firms we assume the programme backs. Independent SMEs receiving single-entity grants show a lasting positive effect, which disappears once a firm belongs to a wider corporate group. Consortium schemes, the instrument Horizon relies on most, showed no measurable effect on long-term growth or innovation. The authors conclude that EU innovation policy should shift towards a bottom-up model: funding ideas rather than large companies, backing small independent firms over large consortia.
That study pooled every sector inside Horizon’s company grants together. This report asks what the picture looks like for biotech specifically (health and non-health biotech), and how biotech compares with other deep tech sectors funded through the same programme. The authors at Bocconi granted us access to the underlying data which lets us investigate what type of biotech firms Horizon funds, where that funding concentrates, and what it produces for the firms that receive it.
Biotech firms funded through Horizon span health, agriculture, food, and industrial applications. Splitting them into separate sector categories would obscure the biological technology they share, so this report groups firms by that shared technology instead, mirroring how the Commission already structures its own deep tech policy under STEP, the EIC, and the Key Enabling Technologies framework.
Three deep technology groupings follow from this:
- Biotech: engineering of biological systems into scalable technologies across health, agriculture, food, and industrial applications.
- Hard tech: largely hardware-based, including advanced materials, advanced manufacturing, micro- and nanoelectronics, quantum, space, and clean energy.
- Digital tech: software-based, including AI, digital systems, and robotics and autonomy[4].
These frameworks already treat different deep tech domains within Europe’s competitiveness and technological sovereignty agenda, funding them through overlapping instruments built on similar assumptions about what firms need. In Brief I, we test whether those assumptions hold for biotech in the way they hold for hard tech and digital tech. Brief II zooms into biotech comparing health to non-health biotech.
What is Horizon?
Horizon Europe, the EU’s €95.5 billion research and innovation programme, is the principal public lever spanning the full innovation pipeline from fundamental science to market-ready deep tech. It operates through three structural pillars:
- Pillar I funds investigator-driven research through the European Research Council and Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions.
- Pillar II, the largest, funds collaborative research and innovation across thematic clusters through multi-partner consortia of universities, research organisations, and industry.
- Pillar III focuses on scaling innovation, centred on the European Innovation Council (EIC), including the EIC Accelerator: the main instrument for firms applying alone rather than through a consortium.
What is the EU Biotech Act?
The proposal for the EU Biotech Act I was published by the European Commission on 16 December 2025 as COM(2025) 1022[5]. It is the EU’s first binding cross-sectoral regulation for biotech, covering health biotech across its full lifecycle, from research through to manufacturing and market access.
The aim is to fix the specific obstacles slowing health biotech firms down: slow permitting, fragmented capital markets, a gap in funding for the stage between demonstrating a technology works and manufacturing it at commercial scale, slow regulation generally, and the biosecurity risks that come with faster biotech development. It introduces strategic projects, a recognition status for individual biotech facilities and initiatives that unlocks faster permitting and priority access to EU funding, and it creates a new investment pilot with the European Investment Bank Group to mobilise capital for scale-up. It also shortens clinical trial authorisation timelines, introduces regulatory sandboxes and other regulatory innovation tools to support regulatory learning for novel products, and adds binding biosecurity and biodefence controls, including mandatory screening of synthetic DNA and biological materials of concern.
A second legislative initiative is now in preparation, covering industrial biotech, agriculture, aquaculture, and food and feed. Its Call for Evidence closed in June 2026, and it is already weighing tools far removed from public funding: lead market designations and minimum content requirements to force demand for bio-based products, and streamlined permitting to cut the delays that currently slow non-health biotech projects from breaking ground[6].
[1] Gros, D., Hofer, S.M., Mengel, P.-L., Molteni, M., Presidente, G., Rujan, C., and Schimmel, F., IEP-COMPET Dataset, IEP@BU Working Paper Series (Institute for European Policymaking, Bocconi University, 2025), https://iep.unibocconi.eu/sites/default/files/media/attach/IEP-COMPET%20Dataset%20(2).pdf (accessed 21 July 2026).
[2] Fuest, C., Gros, D., Mengel, P.-L., Presidente, G., and Rujan, C., Funding Ideas, Not Companies: Rethinking EU Innovation from the Bottom Up, IEP@BU Report No. 245 (Institute for European Policymaking, Bocconi University, and EconPol Europe/ifo Institute, 2025), https://iep.unibocconi.eu/publications/reports/funding-ideas-not-companies-rethinking-eu-innovation-bottom (accessed 21 July 2026).
[3] Fuest, C., Gros, D., Mengel, P.-L., Presidente, G., and Rujan, C., ‘Why EU Innovation Policy Fails to Promote Disruptive Innovation’, VoxEU, 3 December 2025, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/why-eu-innovation-policy-fails-promote-disruptive-innovation (accessed 21 July 2026).
[4] Robotics and autonomy are classified under digital tech. These systems are cyber-physical and rely on hardware such as actuators, sensors, and mechanical platforms, but their differentiation increasingly resides in software such as perception, planning, control, and learning-based autonomy. These software layers are largely platform-agnostic and applied across varied machinery rather than tied to one hardware form, so the competitive edge most often sits with the software dimension.
[5] European Commission, 2025. Proposal for a Regulation on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening the Union’s biotechnology and biomanufacturing sectors, particularly in the area of health (European Biotech Act). COM(2025) 1022 final. Brussels, 16 December.
[6] European Commission, 2026. Call for Evidence: Biotech Act II — industrial biotechnology and biomanufacturing. Brussels.
Brief one
Part one of our analysis examines how EU Horizon research grants reach biotech firms and compares them with their digital and hard tech peers to find out whether the funding fits the way biotech develops.
Read brief oneBrief two
Part two traces how the funding divides between health and non-health biotech, and what that means for early-stage firms doing novel work.
