Response to the Cloud and AI Development Act
Introduction
The Centre for Future Generations (CFG) is a think-and-do tank supporting decision-makers in responsibly governing rapid technological change in the best interests of current and future generations. We welcome the Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) in recognition that Europe needs its own compute capacity to have autonomy over what is critical to its future.
But that ambition only delivers if sovereignty and sustainability are pursued together. Clean power and grid access are real constraints on building compute in Europe: power costs more here than in the US or China,[1] and grid connections take years. The solution cannot lie in fossil fuels, including gas, which would merely replace one dependency with another, undermine Europe’s sovereignty, and jeopardise our climate goals. Capacity that strains the grid, takes land and water from other uses or offers host communities no benefit will be contested and costly to correct, and Europe cannot afford to pay twice, once to build and again to fix.
Investors need certainty, and certainty comes from a social licence to operate and invest, earned before construction and not argued over or renegotiated afterwards. We therefore ask that data centre acceleration zones in particular include conditions from the start that support a fast, fair and sustained buildout.
The Commission’s own impact assessment and recitals recognise the need for safeguards against environmental harm, but the proposal’s articles do not provide for binding thresholds.[2][3] Our full response makes six recommendations to help the proposed Act’s text deliver its own ambitions:
- Binding sustainability conditions for zones and strategic status.
- A fair way to allocate scarce power, grid capacity, land and water.
- A community benefit floor for host communities.
- Public participation, not only public acceptance.
- A generational impact test for zones and strategic projects.
- A Commission Recommendation on high social and environmental standards.
1. Make strategic status depend on sustainability conditions
The Act’s recitals assume that acceleration zones will come with safeguards, but the articles only partly carry them through. Every project in a zone receives strategic status automatically, whatever its footprint (Article 13). Sustainability indicators are drawn from the Energy Efficiency Directive scheme and carry no threshold (Article 11), and the sovereignty levels in Annex II have no sustainability criteria, so a facility can qualify as sovereign and still use power and water inefficiently.[4] Zones are also due six months after entry into force, before the national strategies they should follow. The same timing problem applies to climate risk: under the Commission’s proposed Climate Resilience Law, Member States assess national climate risks by mid-2029 and adopt plans with named risk owners by the end of 2030, well after zones are designated.[5] The grid risk will not ease soon. The IEA finds that European data centres cluster in a few hubs, that the project pipeline in Spain and the Netherlands would reach around 10% of national peak demand, and that grid connection queues in the main hubs run to seven to ten years.[6] It also stresses that data centres must be integrated without pushing up prices for consumers. Where acceleration meets those limits without conditions, projects face delay or other users bear the cost.
Binding conditions already exist in the EU and have not stopped growth. Germany’s Energy Efficiency Act requires new data centres to meet a PUE of 1.2 and all data centres to use 100% renewable electricity from 2027, with waste heat reuse quotas on top, although a government bill now before the Bundestag would postpone the renewables deadline to 2030 and relax the limits for existing sites.[7] Ireland ended its de facto moratorium in December 2025 by attaching conditions to new connections: data centres of 10 MVA and above must bring their own dispatchable generation or storage, and new data centres must source most of their electricity from new Irish renewables.[8] Acceleration zones can apply the same logic, with the floor set at EU level because conditions left to national governments are liable to be weakened, as the German bill shows. Strategic status and zone eligibility should depend on minimum standards for energy, water and clean power, built on the indicators already in Article 11, with clean power measured as additional, time-matched supply and not certificates alone. The Council’s position on the environmental assessments proposal, which CADA relies on and which is still under negotiation, says zone data centres qualify only if they contribute to decarbonisation or resource efficiency.[9] CADA should state and define that test. Zones should follow national strategies that set out their sustainability conditions, with consultation in between, and sovereignty and sustainability should be linked, so that a sovereign service that is also sustainable is given preference. Zones should also be screened against the climate risks we already know about, such as heat, drought and grid stress. The proposed Climate Resilience Law does not mention data centres and only encourages public authorities to consider national climate risk assessments in spatial planning and environmental assessments,[10] so CADA should make that screening a condition of zone designation.
At the same time, energy and water are not the whole environmental footprint of AI infrastructure. The indicators in Article 11 cover energy, water, heat reuse and renewable use, but not land use or biodiversity.[11] Acceleration zones, however, concern land use. The potential breach of environmental law in Finland, where hundreds of hectares of forest had been felled without a proper environmental impact assessment highlights that energy is not the only determinant and data centre projects can face delay on other environmental grounds as well.[12] The Commission’s own impact assessment acknowledges it could not quantify embodied emissions, water use or local effects for lack of harmonised data,[13] and what is not measured cannot be made a condition of fast-tracking.
Recommendation
Make strategic status and zone eligibility depend on clear sustainability conditions, starting from the Article 11 indicators and widened to the full environmental footprint, including land use, biodiversity, air quality and noise, through a Commission study; define the decarbonisation test set out in the Council’s environmental assessments position; require zones to follow national strategies that set out sustainability conditions and to be screened against climate risk at designation; and add sustainability criteria to the sovereignty levels in Annex II.
2. Allocate scarce power, grid capacity, land and water fairly
The Act addresses speculative reservation of land and grid capacity by operators, but not demand from other users. Article 11(2) requires fair terms on “resources” in zones without saying what counts as one, and the energy analysis for each zone is there to plan grid investment for data centres.[14] The proposal does not require an assessment of what else needs the same power, grid connections, land and water. The Commission’s impact assessment says growth could crowd out electrification in other sectors, yet no measure or indicator follows.[15] The IEA expects data centres to account for about 10% of EU electricity demand growth to 2030, alongside the electrification of heating and transport and a recovery in manufacturing, and notes that Dublin and Amsterdam have already paused new projects for lack of grid capacity.[16] The EESC asks for a check that generation keeps pace, which is useful, but the central question is how scarce inputs are prioritised.[17]
The Irish rules described in section 1 show that allocation can be managed deliberately, by tying new connections to what a data centre brings to the system.[18] The IEA recommends queue management that prioritises projects that are ready to build, siting where grid capacity exists, and non-firm connections where users accept curtailment.[19] CADA should apply the same approach to zones. “Resources” in Article 11(2) should include power, grid connection capacity, land and water, and fair terms should cover other users, not only competing operators. Each zone should have a competing-demand assessment at designation and at each review, with industrial decarbonisation and electrification included, and Article 15 monitoring should track it. Where the assessment shows competing demand a zone cannot meet, designation or new connections should be conditional on a prioritisation plan. CADA already sorts public sector cloud services into four assurance levels according to the sensitivity of the use case (Annex II). A similar criticality logic should decide who comes first when power is short: services on which society depends take priority, and flexible workloads can accept curtailment in return for a faster connection, as the IEA suggests.[20] For land, we can measure hectares designated, the share of brownfield, how much of a region’s pre-zoned industrial land is taken, and capacity reserved but never built. For critical raw materials the data is not there yet, so we suggest a reporting duty and a Commission method, starting with materials the Critical Raw Materials Act already treats as strategic.
Recommendation
Extend fairness from operators to uses, with a competing-demand test that puts critical societal functions first and conditions designation and connection on a prioritisation plan, indicators for power, grid, land and water, and a reporting duty for materials.
3. Set a community benefit floor for host communities
As with all big infrastructure projects, communities living near a data centre will bear the greatest pressure on power, water and land. The Act places no obligation on a project towards them. Local economic benefit is one of five criteria for strategic projects, and only where there is a capacity shortage (Article 14).[21] Benefits are left to voluntary developer funds, like Google’s fund in North Weald, Essex, which is grant-based, has no stated size and gives residents no role in deciding how it is spent.[22] The cost of leaving this open is visible in the United States. Data Center Watch counted US$64 billion of projects blocked or delayed amid local opposition in the two years to March 2025, and a further US$98 billion in a single quarter later that year.[23] Its counts are broad and do not establish cause, but water, power prices and noise recur in the cases it tracks. The Commission’s own impact assessment finds that acceptance is highest where data centres visibly contribute locally.[24]
The research supports benefit sharing as a way to raise local acceptance.[25][26] Germany and Ireland already share revenues with host communities: German operators may pay municipalities up to 0.2 cents per kWh, and Ireland requires €2 per MWh into a local fund from every project in its renewable electricity auction.[27][28] US research on wind projects shows that compensation alone is not enough: residents’ perception of a fair planning process shapes their attitude to a nearby project more than a direct financial stake does.[29]
Much like minimum energy performance standards, a community benefit floor would set a minimum level of benefit for every project in an acceleration zone.[30] It would be a baseline, not a ceiling, set at EU level so that communities know what to expect and investors know the terms in advance, with Member States free to go further. The core would be a minimum payment per MWh of electricity consumed, paid into a local fund. At the EU average industrial electricity price (€0.19 per kWh),[31] €2 per MWh is about 1% of the power bill, and, for illustration, 100 MW of continuous load would pay about €1.75 million a year; the level should come out of consultation. Beyond the payment, the floor would cover other local value, such as heat reuse, local skills and jobs, and compute for local public services, decided with the local community (see section 4). The fund should be separate from tax and from compensation for harm, and committed when the zone is designated. The floor should be a condition attached to designation and strategic status, applied through Member States’ permitting, not an EU levy. Both the floor and the sustainability conditions in section 1 should apply above a size threshold, for example the 500 kW of IT capacity that triggers Energy Efficiency Directive reporting,[32] with lighter requirements for smaller operators, in line with the Act’s attention to SMEs.
Recommendation
Add a mandatory community benefit floor to Article 11: this should include a minimum level of benefit for every zone project, with a minimum payment per MWh consumed into a local fund at its core, committed at designation and governed with residents.
4. Move from public acceptance to public participation
The Act mentions giving information to the public to increase public acceptance (Article 12) but that frames, the public as a recipient of information, not as an active participant in decisions.[33] Communities, young people, civil society and workers are not named among those involved when zones are designated. This matters because permits are bundled at zone level and data centres do not automatically need an environmental impact assessment, so designation may be the only stage at which affected people can be heard. The Council’s position also allows Member States to preclude arguments not raised earlier, where the public had a real chance to take part.[34] The EESC has also asked for a time-limited consultation before designation.[35] The Commission has recognised the problem before: its 2022 Recommendation on renewables permitting treats lack of public acceptance as a significant barrier to deployment.[36]
Workers face a gap of their own. The proposal has no provisions on working conditions or social partners. A five-month investigation by Investigate Europe and The Guardian, published on 30 October, found evidence of dangerous conditions, unpaid overtime and intimidation among migrant workers on data centre sites in Sweden, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, with subcontracting chains that make it hard for workers to complain and for unions to monitor conditions.[37] Social partners should be consulted at designation, and decent work and subcontracting transparency should be conditions of strategic status.
To ensure public buy-in, participation should be provided for at designation, before permits are fixed. A defined consultation period, in line with the Aarhus Convention, should come before any zone is designated, with affected communities, young people, civil society and workers’ representatives named as participants. Participation should also reach what the community gets, so the benefit fund should have a local committee with residents, a public register and annual reporting, as in the Irish scheme described in section 3.[38] Participatory budgeting is an established democratic way of giving residents a direct say in how funds are spent: in Fife in 2024, residents voted on wind farm community funding in an event called Benarty Decides, each backing up to three projects.[39] We would not mandate one model across the EU, only that residents hold genuine decision-making power and Member States choose the method.
Recommendation
Replace public acceptance with participation: a consultation window before designation, named roles for communities, young people, workers’ representatives and social partners, and residents running the community benefit funds, with participatory budgeting as an option, and decent work and subcontracting transparency as conditions of strategic status.
5. Test zones and projects for their effect on future generations
Zones and strategic projects are long-lived, generational decisions. Strategic status runs for the project’s expected lifetime and is only withdrawn if the criteria stop being met (Article 14).[40] The first review of the Act comes four years after it enters into force and refers specifically to SMEs and new competitors (Article 47). Land, grid capacity and water used today shape what is left for the next generation. The impact assessment does not mention future generations at all, and gives social impacts 5% of the weight in its multi-criteria analysis for the capacity problem.[41] The timescales differ markedly: a data centre typically takes one to two years to build, while the electricity infrastructure behind it takes much longer.[42]
Wales has put a future-generations test in law. Its Well-being of Future Generations Act 2015 requires public bodies to apply a sustainable development principle with five ways of working, including long-term thinking, prevention and involvement, and creates a Commissioner who acts as guardian of future generations.[43] We propose a lighter alternative: a two-sided test at designation, built into the energy analysis for each zone (Article 10(2)), made mandatory and not only “where appropriate”, and into strategic project designation, not a new process. It should ask what the project locks in by 2040, the EU’s next binding climate target,[44] in energy source and emissions; what it uses up, such as land, grid capacity, water and materials; what it makes possible, such as clean power integration, heat reuse, circularity; and what happens at the end of its life, including who bears the cost if it is stranded. Strategic status should be reviewed at fixed intervals instead of lasting the whole life of the project, and the Article 47 review should cover climate, resource use and communities. The test should weigh the risks of acting and the cost of not acting, as in our submission to the Intergenerational Fairness Strategy.[45] The aim is to ultimately keep future generations’ choices open.
Recommendation
Add a two-sided generational test to zone and strategic project designation, review strategic status at fixed intervals, and widen the Article 47 review.
6. Guide Member States with a Commission Recommendation
Member States must designate zones and write national strategies that favour “high-value” data centres with societal benefits and high environmental standards (Article 7).[46] None of those terms is defined. The impact assessment names national fragmentation as a core problem.[47] Without shared methods, Member States are likely to interpret the conditions differently, leaving communities and investors with fragmented rules. The Commission can already recommend measures on the capacity gap (recital 44), but only on capacity.
The Commission has used this tool before to speed up deployment while setting good practice. Its 2022 Recommendation on permitting for renewable energy came with detailed guidance for Member States, was updated in 2024, and was followed by a monitoring study of implementation in 2025.[48] On the social side, the 2022 Council Recommendation on ensuring a fair transition towards climate neutrality, proposed by the Commission, gave Member States concrete guidance on policy packages for the employment and social aspects of the transition, and its implementation has since been reviewed.[49] A Recommendation on implementing high social and environmental standards for data centres could do the same here. Adopted alongside the Act and prepared with Member States, communities, social partners and civil society, it should cover how to assess a data centre’s full footprint (energy, water, equipment and materials, circularity, regional economy and resilience), models for community benefit funds and participation, indicators for competing demand, and what “high-value” and “societal benefit” mean in Article 7. It should also say who does what at which level: the EU sets floors and methods, Member States designate zones and allocate scarce inputs, and local authorities run consultation and benefit funds. A Recommendation is soft law, so it supports the binding conditions in section 1 and does not replace them.
Recommendation
Building on the Commission’s own good practice, adopt a Recommendation to guide Member States in setting high environmental and social standards in their national cloud and AI strategies, including a definition of “high-value” data centres for Article 7, with the same definition written into the Act itself.
Our commitment moving forward
CFG supports the Act’s ambition to build capacity Europe controls. Our research and practice indicate this is best done with conditions, community benefit, and participation built in from the start, so that the AI buildout is fast, fair and sustained. We are ready to contribute our expertise and networks to implementation.
Please contact Namita Kambli at the Centre for Future Generations with any questions or to request further briefing.
All web sources accessed between 23 October and 6 November 2026.
[1] European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment Report, SWD(2026) 502 final, Parts 1 and 2, and Executive Summary, SWD(2026) 503 final, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Cited for energy prices, crowding out of electrification, public opposition, permitting delays, local acceptance and the limits on data for embodied impacts.
[2] European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment Report, SWD(2026) 502 final, Parts 1 and 2, and Executive Summary, SWD(2026) 503 final, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Cited for energy prices, crowding out of electrification, public opposition, permitting delays, local acceptance and the limits on data for embodied impacts.
[3] European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s cloud and AI ecosystem (Cloud and AI Development Act), COM(2026) 502 final, with Annexes 1 to 3, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Provisions relied on: recitals 37 to 41 and 44, Articles 7, 10 to 15 and 47, and Annex II.
[4] European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s cloud and AI ecosystem (Cloud and AI Development Act), COM(2026) 502 final, with Annexes 1 to 3, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Provisions relied on: recitals 37 to 41 and 44, Articles 7, 10 to 15 and 47, and Annex II.
[5] European Commission, Proposal for a European Climate Resilience Law, COM(2026) 730, and Communication on the EU Framework for Climate Resilience, 27 October 2026, text of the proposal, in particular Articles 2, 4(2), 5 and 7, and the summary in Linklaters, European Commission presents EU Climate Resilience Framework.
[6] International Energy Agency, Overcoming energy constraints is key to delivering on Europe’s data centre goals, commentary, 16 November 2025.
[7] Germany, Energy Efficiency Act (EnEfG), 2023, as summarised in Columbia Law School Sabin Center, From EU Framework to National Action: How Germany Regulates Data Center Energy Use, 24 October 2025, and Reed Smith, German Energy Efficiency Act: new challenges for data centre operators. On the 2026 amendment bill (Drucksache 21/8027): Deutscher Bundestag, first reading, 24 September 2026, and CMS Germany, EnEfG-Novelle bringt Entlastung für Rechenzentren. Industry concerns: Cundall, Has the German Energy Efficiency Act become a thorn in the side of German data centre operators?
[8] Commission for Regulation of Utilities (Ireland), Large Energy Users Connection Policy, final decision CRU/2025/236, 12 December 2025, as summarised in Philip Lee, Re-balancing the digital bargain: Ireland’s new CRU Large Energy User connection policy, and IT Brief UK, Ireland unveils strict new rules for data centre power use.
[9] Council of the EU, Proposal for a Regulation on speeding-up environmental assessments: mandate for negotiations with the European Parliament, 13851/26, 30 September 2026. The Commission proposal is COM(2025) 984 final, 10 December 2025.
[10] European Commission, Proposal for a European Climate Resilience Law, COM(2026) 730, and Communication on the EU Framework for Climate Resilience, 27 October 2026, text of the proposal, in particular Articles 2, 4(2), 5 and 7, and the summary in Linklaters, European Commission presents EU Climate Resilience Framework.
[11] European Commission, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1364, Annexes II and III (key performance indicators, and the PUE, WUE, ERF and REF sustainability indicators).
[12] Miranda Bryant, Google told to halt work on datacentres in Finland over environmental concerns, The Guardian, 6 October 2026; and eWeek, Google’s €13B Finland Data Center Push Hits Roadblock.
[13] European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment Report, SWD(2026) 502 final, Parts 1 and 2, and Executive Summary, SWD(2026) 503 final, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Cited for energy prices, crowding out of electrification, public opposition, permitting delays, local acceptance and the limits on data for embodied impacts.
[14] European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s cloud and AI ecosystem (Cloud and AI Development Act), COM(2026) 502 final, with Annexes 1 to 3, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Provisions relied on: recitals 37 to 41 and 44, Articles 7, 10 to 15 and 47, and Annex II.
[15] European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment Report, SWD(2026) 502 final, Parts 1 and 2, and Executive Summary, SWD(2026) 503 final, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Cited for energy prices, crowding out of electrification, public opposition, permitting delays, local acceptance and the limits on data for embodied impacts.
[16] International Energy Agency, Overcoming energy constraints is key to delivering on Europe’s data centre goals, commentary, 16 November 2025.
[17] European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion INT/1126, Cloud and AI Development Act, adopted at plenary on 23 September 2026.
[18] Commission for Regulation of Utilities (Ireland), Large Energy Users Connection Policy, final decision CRU/2025/236, 12 December 2025, as summarised in Philip Lee, Re-balancing the digital bargain: Ireland’s new CRU Large Energy User connection policy, and IT Brief UK, Ireland unveils strict new rules for data centre power use.
[19] International Energy Agency, Overcoming energy constraints is key to delivering on Europe’s data centre goals, commentary, 16 November 2025.
[20] International Energy Agency, Overcoming energy constraints is key to delivering on Europe’s data centre goals, commentary, 16 November 2025.
[21] European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s cloud and AI ecosystem (Cloud and AI Development Act), COM(2026) 502 final, with Annexes 1 to 3, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Provisions relied on: recitals 37 to 41 and 44, Articles 7, 10 to 15 and 47, and Annex II.
[22] Essex Community Foundation, Google Essex Data Centre Community Fund opens for applications, 3 August 2026.
[23] Data Center Watch (10a Labs), as reported in Data Center Dynamics, Group claims $64bn in US data center projects impacted by local opposition in last two years, and Courthouse News, Big Tech’s fast-expanding plans for data centers are running into stiff community opposition.
[24] European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment Report, SWD(2026) 502 final, Parts 1 and 2, and Executive Summary, SWD(2026) 503 final, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Cited for energy prices, crowding out of electrification, public opposition, permitting delays, local acceptance and the limits on data for embodied impacts.
[25] Can’t buy me acceptance?, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 175, article 113158, 2023.
[26] Hogan, J., Why does community ownership foster greater acceptance of renewable projects? Investigating energy justice explanations, Local Environment, 2024.
[27] Section 6 of the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), as explained in Mondaq, Participation of local municipalities in the context of wind and photovoltaic projects.
[28] Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland, Community Benefit Funds; Oireachtas, written answer on RESS Community Benefit Funds, 3 November 2021.
[29] Mills, S. B., Bessette, D. and Smith, H., Exploring landowners’ post-construction changes in perceptions of wind energy in Michigan, Land Use Policy, vol. 82, 2019, pp. 754-762 (Purdue University copy); and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, New Berkeley Lab study explores possibilities for more fair and transparent wind energy planning processes, 22 March 2022.
[30] European Commission, Directive (EU) 2024/1275 of 24 April 2024 on the energy performance of buildings (recast), Article 9, for the minimum energy performance standards for non-residential buildings; and Mondaq, European Commission Advances Data Center Sustainability Ratings And Consults On Minimum Performance Standards, on the Commission’s consultation on minimum performance standards for data centres.
[31] European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment Report, SWD(2026) 502 final, Parts 1 and 2, and Executive Summary, SWD(2026) 503 final, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Cited for energy prices, crowding out of electrification, public opposition, permitting delays, local acceptance and the limits on data for embodied impacts.
[32] European Commission, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1364, Annexes II and III (key performance indicators, and the PUE, WUE, ERF and REF sustainability indicators).
[33] European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s cloud and AI ecosystem (Cloud and AI Development Act), COM(2026) 502 final, with Annexes 1 to 3, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Provisions relied on: recitals 37 to 41 and 44, Articles 7, 10 to 15 and 47, and Annex II.
[34] Council of the EU, Proposal for a Regulation on speeding-up environmental assessments: mandate for negotiations with the European Parliament, 13851/26, 30 September 2026. The Commission proposal is COM(2025) 984 final, 10 December 2025.
[35] European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion INT/1126, Cloud and AI Development Act, adopted at plenary on 23 September 2026.
[36] European Commission, Recommendation (EU) 2022/822 of 18 May 2022 on speeding up permit-granting procedures for renewable energy projects and facilitating Power Purchase Agreements, with guidance SWD(2022) 149; updated by Recommendation (EU) 2024/1343 and SWD(2024) 124.
[37] Investigate Europe and The Guardian, Electrocutions, ‘mental terror’ and withheld wages: the exploited workers building Europe’s data centres, 30 October 2026; and The Guardian, Electrocutions, disease and no pay: how workers risk exploitation in Europe’s datacentres, 30 October 2026.
[38] Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland, Community Benefit Funds; Oireachtas, written answer on RESS Community Benefit Funds, 3 November 2021.
[39] Foundation Scotland, Benarty Decides: participatory grantmaking in action.
[40] European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s cloud and AI ecosystem (Cloud and AI Development Act), COM(2026) 502 final, with Annexes 1 to 3, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Provisions relied on: recitals 37 to 41 and 44, Articles 7, 10 to 15 and 47, and Annex II.
[41] European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment Report, SWD(2026) 502 final, Parts 1 and 2, and Executive Summary, SWD(2026) 503 final, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Cited for energy prices, crowding out of electrification, public opposition, permitting delays, local acceptance and the limits on data for embodied impacts.
[42] International Energy Agency, Overcoming energy constraints is key to delivering on Europe’s data centre goals, commentary, 16 November 2025.
[43] Future Generations Commissioner for Wales, The Well-being of Future Generations Act; Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015.
[44] Regulation (EU) 2026/667 amending the European Climate Law, adopted by the Council on 5 March 2026, which sets a binding 2040 target of a 90% net greenhouse gas reduction on 1990 levels; see European Commission, European Climate Law.
[45] Centre for Future Generations, Submission to the EU Intergenerational Fairness Strategy, 17 November 2025.
[46] European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s cloud and AI ecosystem (Cloud and AI Development Act), COM(2026) 502 final, with Annexes 1 to 3, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Provisions relied on: recitals 37 to 41 and 44, Articles 7, 10 to 15 and 47, and Annex II.
[47] European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment Report, SWD(2026) 502 final, Parts 1 and 2, and Executive Summary, SWD(2026) 503 final, Brussels, 3 June 2026. Cited for energy prices, crowding out of electrification, public opposition, permitting delays, local acceptance and the limits on data for embodied impacts.
[48] European Commission, Recommendation (EU) 2022/822 of 18 May 2022 on speeding up permit-granting procedures for renewable energy projects and facilitating Power Purchase Agreements, with guidance SWD(2022) 149; updated by Recommendation (EU) 2024/1343 and SWD(2024) 124.
[49] Council Recommendation of 16 June 2022 on ensuring a fair transition towards climate neutrality (2022/C 243/04), OJ C 243, 27.6.2022, p. 35, adopted on the Commission’s proposal COM(2021) 801; see European Commission, Member States commit to action for a fair transition towards climate neutrality, 16 June 2022, and the progress review of its implementation, SWD(2026) 240.