Reinforcing biosecurity

This report is part of our project Strategic innovation for European security. It identifies ten emerging technologies the EU should invest in to safeguard its security and uphold European values in the face of rapid technological change, geopolitical instability, and economic uncertainty.

Amongst the ten technologies we identify, three of them fall within biosecurity.

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the high cost of being caught unprepared when a major pandemic hits. The virus cost the global economy trillions of Euros, disrupted every aspect of daily life, and caused more than 25 million excess deaths worldwide^[1]. Even in less extreme scenarios, endemic diseases such as seasonal influenza impose a significant and ongoing burden; seasonal flu alone costs Europe €6-14 billion annually^[2].

Whereas it is common to think about major biological events as confined to natural, once-in-a-century occurrences, this is not the case. Their likelihood and severity have always been influenced by human behaviour, demographics, and technology. During the 20th century, air travel, urbanization, and globalisation made societies more susceptible to pathogen transmission by enabling pathogens to spread further and faster than ever before, even as vaccinations and improved hygiene limited the transmission of some pathogens^[3]. Today – as previously argued by CFG’s biotechnology experts in Biotechnology and the next pandemic – a multitude of drivers combine to further increase the likelihood and potential impact of biological events^[4].

Historically, the primary driver of biorisk has been zoonotic spillover – where a disease jumps from animals to humans. Around 75% of all known infectious diseases are zoonotic – including both pandemics, epidemics, and endemic diseases^[5]. MERS, Rift Valley Fever, SARS, Avian Flu, and Ebola all have their origins in zoonotic spillover. Today, this risk is intensifying due to climate induced habitat disturbance, which is bringing more types of disease-carrying animals into areas where people live^[6]. In addition, legal wildlife trade has surged by more than 500% in economic terms since 2005, increasing human-animal interactions^[7]. Furthermore, the expansion of factory farming, characterized by high-density confinement of animals, facilitates pathogen transmission and accelerates the evolution of more virulent strains and increasing the risk of diseases jumping from animals to humans^[8].

A more recent driver is the accidental release of dangerous pathogens from labs owing to human and technical errors^[9]. Over the past 25 years, there has been a boom in the construction of so-called maximum security containment labs – labs used to study toxins and infectious diseases for which no vaccine or treatment is available. Whereas there were only 13 such labs in the world in 2000, there were 69 either in operation or under construction by 2023, spread across 27 countries^[10]. The EU has effective regulations in place for maximum security containment labs, but the rapid increase in number globally has not been met with sufficient safety oversight internationally^[11]. Accordingly, as our colleagues noted last year, the risk of a laboratory leak “turning into a pandemic in the next 100 years could be as high as 36%”^[12].

Today, the risk of biological events is further heightened by the prospect of bioterrorism, once an unlikely scenario due to the high barriers of expertise and specialized facilities required to engineer harmful pathogens. The democratisation of emerging technologies such as DNA benchtop printers^[13], precision genetic engineering^[14], and specialised AI models^[15] have made DNA synthesis capabilities accessible to non-specialists, lowering the skill-level required for malicious actors to produce and deploy dangerous pathogens and bioweapons^[16]. This shift is especially alarming because engineered pathogens could be designed to maximise transmission or lethality, and therefore inflict a level of economic losses and number of fatalities that far outweighs that of COVID-19^[17].

Due to these three developments, research suggests the likelihood of another pandemic outbreak is far higher than what is often assumed. By 2050, experts calculate that there is a 50% probability that we will see another pandemic exceeding at least 25 million mortalities^[18]. This risk could be greatly elevated if genome sequences for pandemic capable pathogens are publicly released^[19].

The expected annual mortality from viral disease originating from zoonotic spillover alone is 3.3 million^[20], amounting to around 180,000 mortalities on average in the EU, every year. While most years see relatively few deaths, events like the COVID pandemic see millions of deaths in just a few years, making up most of the annualised average. Given that this estimate does not include the increased risks from accidental release from labs and bioterrorism, this is likely a conservative estimate for the future.

In addition to the human toll, viral zoonotic outbreaks alone carry an annualized economic risk of approximately €45 billion in Europe^[21]. This expected loss in Gross National Income aligns closely with historical precedents, notably the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in immediate GDP losses of roughly €790 billion in 2020^[22] and a total estimated economic cost over €1.8 trillion across Europe^[23]. This underscores the need to mitigate the risks associated with pandemics, laboratory accidents, and bioterrorism.

Building the necessary biosecurity capabilities required to respond to this risk requires deliberate and strategic investment. By investing in and utilising the complementary technologies outlined in this brief, the EU can build a robust, layered defence that will protect present and future generations from biological threats, and improve its technological competitiveness within productive biotechnologies at the same time.

Our chapter on biosecurity outlines a layered defensive strategy – advocates for investment in technologies which enable early detection, rapid response, and transmission suppression in order to contain and mitigate biological events, regardless of their origin:

• Early detection: Continuous biointelligence using metagenomic sequencing can enable the rapid identification of emerging pathogens, significantly reducing response times.
• Rapid response: Advances in DNA synthesis and biofoundries can accelerate vaccine and therapeutic development, supporting the internationally recognised goal of being able to develop a vaccine response to a novel pandemic within 100 days of detection^[24].
• Transmission suppression: Technologies like far-UVC light, elastomeric respirators, and glycol vapors, can create an added layer of protection by minimizing transmission between detection and response.

This layered defence strategy is designed to ensure the early detection of emerging pathogens, enable the development of a novel vaccine within 100 days of detection, and minimize transmission in the interim, containing outbreaks before they escalate into global crises.

Metagenomic sequencing

DNA sequencing is among the most significant technological advancements of the 21st century. The basic technology has been available since the 1970s, but it was too costly and labour intensive to be fully utilised outside of specialised lab settings for several decades. During the Human Genome Project, sequencing the first full human genome took four years (1999-2003) and cost an estimated €450-950 million^[25]. The US National Human Genome Research Institute estimates that at the time of the project’s completion in 2003, the cost of sequencing a second human genome using the best available technologies was somewhere in the neighbourhood of €50 million. Since then, the cost has been reduced more than 100,000-fold, down to less than €500 – substantially outpacing Moore’s Law^[26].

This dramatic reduction in cost has not only made conventional DNA sequencing more accessible, but has also enabled advancements in metagenomic sequencing – a technology with substantial applications for global biosecurity. Conventional sequencing methods used in biointelligence – like Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)^[27] – require specific primers to detect specific pathogens that we already know to look for. Metagenomic sequencing, however, is pathogen agnostic and can detect any microorganism present in a given sample without prior knowledge of what is there^[28]. This untargeted approach allows scientists to analyze the entire genetic composition of complex clinical- and environmental samples from wastewater, air, and soil^[29].

Metagenomic sequencing is now becoming sufficiently cost-efficient in order to be utilised far more extensively than in the past, emerging as a technology with transformative biosecurity applications and strong associated economic benefits.

Security benefits

Pandemic preparedness was flagged by the Niinistö report as a critical security issue, noting that all Member States and the EU as a whole were insufficiently prepared for COVID^[30]. The pandemic exposed vulnerabilities on multiple fronts, including in our biointelligence and early detection systems^[31]. Early detection of emerging pathogens with pandemic potential is critical because earlier implementation of medical and non-medical countermeasures enhance their effectiveness. Experts at RAND estimate that a biointelligence system based on environmental surveillance that provides a 5-day early warning relative to conventional systems during the COVID-19 pandemic would reduce mortalities from 149 to 134 per 100,000 population^[32]. With the EU’s population at 450 million, that is approximately 70 000 lives saved in one year. Early detection is therefore a critical component of our layered defence.

Historically, detection has relied upon clinical testing through targeted sequencing methods like PCR, which has some inefficiencies. Whilst accurate, it often lags behind actual infection rates, missing early cases and allowing the virus to circulate undetected. Moreover, clinical testing is frequently hampered by limited resources, unequal healthcare access amongst the population, and biases in sample collection, all of which can delay outbreak recognition and impede timely public health interventions^[33]. Especially “stealthy” pathogens – pathogens that are able to circulate undetected for long periods of time due to long incubation periods – are not reliably detected by existing biointelligence systems using PCR.

Clinical detection using PCR is further limited to known pathogens of interest and rely on an astute physician to test for the right pathogen in a clinical sample^[34]. Metagenomic sequencing improves upon and complements conventional methods by enabling practitioners to detect pathogens they are not already looking for or do not already know about, in more complex samples^[35].

Metagenomic sequencing further enhances the ability to detect novel pathogens. Metagenomic sequencing data can be analysed with the aid of computational tools like Kraken^[36] and MetaPhlAn^[37] to search for taxonomic similarities between groups of viruses and genetic material present in a given sample and infer if it is a new pathogen which has previously not been present in humans^[38]. As humans do not have a preexisting immune response to novel pathogens, they are particularly dangerous – underscoring the need to detect them as early as possible^[39]. This method also enhances the identification of new mutations, including new variants of known pathogens and evolutions like antimicrobial resistance genes in bacteria, providing higher coverage of dangerous emergent genes which conventional methods might miss^[40].

Biointelligence using metagenomic sequencing of wastewater from population centres and transportation hubs – in addition to clinical samples – can complement conventional methods by providing continuous, community-wide monitoring of pathogens, known and unknown^[41]. When used in environmental samples, it can capture the genetic material shed by entire populations, and reveal transmission trends that symptomatic surveillance are likely to miss. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, researchers successfully detected the emergence of new variants at a large university campus up to 14 days before they appeared in clinical samples, using genomic surveillance of local wastewater^[42].

Utilising metagenomic sequencing more extensively in routine biointelligence gathering can therefore significantly improve our pandemic preparedness. Its use in continuous monitoring of strategic locations, using both environmental and clinical samples, can enable public health authorities to detect, track, and characterize new pathogens rapidly, potentially containing outbreaks before they become widespread. However, realising these benefits requires sustainable funding models and policy coordination concerning the sharing of sequencing data^[43].

Economic benefits

There is significant economic potential in a robust data analysis industry that supports a global biointelligence network. Metagenomic sequencing generates vast datasets that require continuous data analysis to accurately distinguish pathogens from environmental background noise. Today, there is a growing bio-detection industry which includes “disease forecasting” companies like Airfinity that collect and analyse global health data to identify and track pathogens and other biological agents. The industry is projected to grow from €15.6 billion in 2024 to €28.9 billion in 2030, with a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 11.3%^[44]. Scaling up compute resources through public-private partnerships and investing in cutting-edge specialised computational tools such as METAGENE-1^[45], will be important in developing this industry within Europe.

The global market for DNA sequencing services is projected to grow substantially as well, currently valued at €15.9 billion and projected to reach €42.9 billion by 2030, with a CAGR of 21.4%^[46]. By building out the infrastructure required for extensive utilisation of metagenomics in environmental and clinical biointelligence, the EU can position itself to capture a greater market share within this growing industry.

While metagenomic sequencing is more expensive than conventional methods, it is becoming increasingly cost-effective. In 2022, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy estimated that establishing a biointelligence system using wastewater sampling and metagenomic sequencing at all major ports of entry in the United States would cost approximately €1 billion annually – a figure likely similar for Europe^[47]. Updated figures, however, suggest that this is rapidly becoming orders of magnitude cheaper, which could enable both broader and more detailed observations across Europe – for example in every city – at a much lower cost^[48].

As indicated by simulations from the Nucleic Acid Observatory (NAO), operating ten wastewater sampling sites and subjecting each sample to deep metagenomic sequencing would cost only around €10 million annually^[49], while substantially improving our ability to detect stealthy pathogens which traditional methods are prone to miss^[50]. As such, according to experts at the NAO, covering all ports of entry the the US and EU with wastewater metagenomic sequencing biointelligence sites could be achieved at an annual cost of €20-50 million, depending on the system’s exact parameters. Such systems are likely to become increasingly affordable as research into sequencing technology continues to advance and the required infrastructure becomes more widely available. On a global scale, a scaled-down system could monitor key air traffic hubs and urban areas by analyzing environmental samples for as little as tens of millions of Euros per year. As the cost, speed, and analytics for metagenomics continue to improve, it may become “routinely applied in clinical and public health laboratories” as well^[51].

Europe’s Position

Europe is well positioned to lead global biointelligence, yet scaling up its nascent capabilities and investing further in data analytics remains essential. The EU is home to multiple leading companies in this space, including Eurofins and bioMérieux, and Europe (including the UK) accounted for around 25% of global revenues in 2023^[52]. However, the US currently dominates in this space with just above 46% of global revenues^[53].

In terms of policy, the EU has already been proactive in facilitating improved biointelligence, regionally and globally. In January 2025, The European Health Emergency Response Authority (HERA) announced the European Wastewater Surveillance Dashboard – a database which integrates data from across member states to track three known pathogens of interest; COVID-19, Influenza and Syncytial virus^[54]. The EU also has a central position in the Global Consortium for Wastewater and Environmental Surveillance for Public Health (GLOWACON), which brings together international partners to create an inter-sectoral sentinel system, sharing sequencing data and monitoring emerging threats across borders^[55].

The EU can increase its market share and facilitate the increased use of metagenomic sequencing methods by investing in its biointelligence infrastructure and expanding public–private partnerships. European companies and startups specializing in advanced sequencing technologies and data analytics are critical to gathering and processing the vast, complex datasets generated by extensive metagenomic sequencing. By standardizing analytical methods and scaling up computational resources, the EU can secure a larger market share in the global biointelligence industry, enhance its technological competitiveness, and ensure a faster, more coordinated response to future pandemic and endemic outbreaks.

Secure Biofoundries

The COVID-19 pandemic did not just reveal the world’s vulnerabilities to biological threats; it also demonstrated our capacity to quickly engineer a medical response. The remarkable development of safe, effective vaccines within 12 months of the outbreak demonstrated the ability to mobilize biotechnology at unprecedented speed. The first trials for a COVID-19 vaccine began just 65 days after the coronavirus genome was sequenced, the fastest vaccine development in history – by far^[56].

However, before vaccine deployment could reach sufficient scale, millions of lives were lost globally. After clinical trials began, it took another nine months to test and approve the first vaccine, the first being authorised by the ECDC on December 21st 2020^[57]. From when the first full genome sequence of COVID-19^[58] was made available on January 11th 2020, it took in total 458 days before one billion people had been vaccinated globally – at which point 29 million had been vaccinated in the EU, covering just about 6.5% of the total EU population^[59].

The ambition to be able to deliver a vaccine within 100 days of pathogen detection has now become a widely embraced strategic target^[60]. Referred to as the “100-days mission”, this target has been endorsed by the G7, G20^[61] and the EU’s HERA^[62]. However, existing capabilities for developing, testing, producing, and delivering vaccines are insufficient to reach this target^[63].

Biofoundries represent precisely the kind of transformative infrastructure required to achieve the 100-day mission. These are sophisticated facilities equipped with robotic automation, artificial intelligence, high-throughput analytics, and increasingly cost effective advanced DNA synthesis technologies^[64], enabling rapid and parallel prototyping and production in biological engineering.

Security benefits

The rapid development of the COVID-19 vaccine is estimated to have saved almost 20 million lives, but modelling by The Lancet estimates that if the 100-days mission had been achieved during the last pandemic, a further 8.33 million deaths globally could have been saved^[65]. Advanced biofoundries could be key to achieving this goal, as they can use automated systems to run thousands of tests at once. This means that new vaccines, diagnostic tests, and treatments can be designed much faster than traditional methods allow.

Biofoundries streamline the design-build-test-learn cycle of biomedical research. They significantly enhance the accuracy and reproducibility of experimental outcomes through the integration of cutting-edge computational tools into this research cycle, and are “at the forefront of a paradigm shift in biological engineering toward a more automated, design-focused venture”^[66]. The ability to run multiple experiments quickly and simultaneously is not only vital for accelerating vaccine development, but also enables the swift translation of laboratory discoveries into scalable manufacturing processes, ensuring that vaccine production can be ramped up quickly following its discovery and regulatory approval^[67]. By integrating digital design tools like BioCAD^[68], biofoundries enable the transfer of detailed instructions to smaller, localised biomanufacturing facilities for production. In this way, biofoundries can provide the foundation for a distributed manufacturing model for vaccines, and reduce the need to physically transport vaccines under carefully controlled temperatures across long distances, thereby substantially accelerating vaccine delivery across the EU^[69].

Biofoundries also have further biosecurity applications, and can be used for expediting the screening of therapeutic antibodies, antiviral drugs, and diagnostic tools. Additionally, biofoundries can be repurposed to serve as independent testing centers to perform PCR and serological assays, allowing for fast and accurate detection of infections and tracking of virus variants, which is critical during a pandemic^[70]. Biofoundries can further host the creation of new, innovative approaches to synthetic biology, like next-generation microbial cell factories^[71] and chrysalis-based “living bioreactors” like the CEPI-funded Algenex in Spain, which leverages genetically modified insect viruses to produce viral antigens, again potentially enabling vaccines to be manufactured even more swiftly and affordably^[72].

A robust ecosystem of biofoundries across the EU would also mitigate global supply chain vulnerabilities for vaccines. In critical moments during the COVID-19 pandemic, global powers throughout the world resorted to export restrictions on vaccines and critical raw materials needed for their production – including the EU^[73]. By strengthening its biomanufacturing infrastructure through strategic investment now, the EU can reduce its reliance on external providers and be better equipped to export its own vaccines abroad, reducing global fatalities and limiting the impact on the global economy^[74]. This is even more critical as the pendulum of global trade swings towards protectionism.

However, as we discuss in the introduction to our chapter on biosecurity, advances in synthetic biology do introduce new biosecurity risks which require a policy response from the EU. The same technology that enables rapid vaccine production could be exploited to synthesize harmful genetic sequences if not properly regulated. To counter this, the EU must implement stringent security protocols, such as comprehensive “Know Your Customer” (KYC) standards for biofoundries and other providers of made-to-order synthetic DNA, thereby limiting the access of parties seeking to misuse biological material^[75]. This measure would function in the same way as in other industries which require the collection of data about a customer before providing them with a service, like anti-money laundering protocols in the financial sector^[76].

Whereas biofoundries themselves are not new, this is an area which has seen a lot of scientific progress in recent years. In order to fully capitalise on these advancements, a fully integrated biofoundry requires “significant – and ongoing – investment”^[77] into cutting-edge equipment, software and real-time monitoring systems, and highly skilled personnel. This makes biofoundries expansive to establish and operate.

Realizing this potential requires significant investment, coordination, and policy support. Biofoundries are expensive to establish and require cutting-edge robotic equipment and automation systems, as well as a highly skilled workforce^[78]. As such, long term public funding mechanisms and incentives for public-private partnerships are needed to equip existing biofoundries with state-of-the art equipment, scale up facilities to breach cost-barriers in production, and attract and train high-skilled workers to operate them.

Economic benefits

The global synthetic biology market is projected to grow substantially from approximately €21.8 billion in 2025 to €171.5 billion by 2034, with a compound annual growth rate of 28.6%^[79]. By investing in and expanding its network of advanced biofoundries, Europe can capture a substantial share of this growing global market.

Investing in biofoundries is further an opportunity for the EU to expand the size and productivity of its bioeconomy. By accelerating the development of bio-based alternatives to fossil-derived products and supporting key industries such as biopharmaceuticals, biofuels, biodegradable plastics, and food production. For example, they can enhance precision fermentation for producing alternative proteins, optimize microbial strains for biodegradable plastics^[80], or engineer microbes that break down industrial waste^[81]. Biomanufacturing is also leading to enhanced products like textiles like “spider silk”^[82] which is lighter and up to three times stronger than kevlar, and engineered living building materials (LBMs)^[83] like self-repairing concrete. As such, this investment can give Europe a competitive edge in creating greener, high-value products, aligning with the stated aims of the EU’s Green Deal^[84] and the Circular Economy Action Plan^[85].

In virtue of these broad applications, some projections see synthetic biology as disrupting a broad range of industries and increasing the size of the global bioeconomy from €4 trillion to €30 trillion over the next 25 years^[86]. The potential of this industry was acknowledged by the European Commission’s 2024 Communication on Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing, following the US^[87] and China^[88] who have already established comprehensive frameworks to utilise biomanufacturing to further their economic and security interests.

Europe’s position

Because biofoundries range from public research-oriented biofoundries to industrial-scale plants and private company biofoundries, they differ considerably from each other in their equipment, funding models, and primary applications. For that reason, estimates and counts of the number of biofoundries differ quite a lot, which makes it difficult to fully assess the global dynamics around this technology.

According to the EU Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the Global Biofoundries Alliance (GBA), the EU has a competitive number of publicly funded biofoundries to that of the US and China, although their counts differ. The JRC lists four in the EU, and four each in the US and China^[89], whilst the GBA has 35 publicly funded biofoundries as members globally, of which six are from the EU and US, respectively^[90]. The DIM BioConvergence Initiative, however, published a non-exhaustive list of public, private and governmental  biofoundries, which lists 10 in the US and 4 in the EU^[91]. Notable European biofoundries not counted in these estimates include the Lesaffre Campus in Lille, established in 2022^[92], and the Bio Base Europe Pilot Plant in Ghent, established in 2024^[93].

However, the EU’s relative position within global biomanufacturing, more generally, is in decline.

Whereas Europe already has an established position in genomics and pharmaceuticals, and holds a 28.1% share of the global synthetic biology market^[95], the share of Europe-based emerging biopharma companies dropping consistently over the past decade^[96]. The US has significantly expanded its biomanufacturing capabilities through initiatives like BioMADE, initially funded with €81 million in 2020 and boosted by an additional €417 million in 2023^[97], and has set ambitious goals to fulfill at least 30% of its chemical demand via biomanufacturing within two decades^[98]. China has also committed substantial resources, investing approximately €3.86 billion in biomanufacturing infrastructure in 2024 alone, under its 14th Five-Year Plan, including the establishment of the National Innovation Center for Biomanufacturing in Shenzhen^[99]. South Korea has likewise recognized synthetic biology as strategically critical, planning an investment of approximately $100 million between 2025–2029 to develop advanced biofoundries focusing on biologics and sustainable materials^[100]. There are therefore calls for European decision-makers to ramp up investment in the sector, with DIM BioConvergence arguing for the establishment of a new academic biofoundry in the Ile-de-France region, towards the end of providing researchers with state-of-the-art facilities and tools, and make them better situated to compete globally^[101].

As argued by our colleagues earlier this year, the EU’s investment in biotechnology and biomanufacturing as a whole must increase in order for it to remain competitive within this space^[102]. Between 2016 and 2022, the US stood for 64.16% of global investment in the sector, followed by China with 20.23%. EU Member States collectively accounted for only 9.36%^[103]. Accordingly, as reported by the European Commission in 2024, the EU’s share of global biotech patents is only 18.3% as compared to the US’ 39.6% as of 2020^[104]. Bold measures are therefore required in order to secure the future competitiveness of European biomanufacturing^[105]. 

The EU has introduced multiple initiatives to improve its position within biomanufacturing, including the Bioeconomy Strategy^[106] and plans to introduce an EU Biotech Act^[107]. In 2023, the European Commission announced the Industrial Biotechnology Innovation and Synthetic Biology Accelerator to address current shortfalls in “research infrastructure in the field of biotechnology and biomanufacturing” and eventually lead to the creation of a pan-European research infrastructure consortium for biotechnology in 2026^[108]. The subsequent HERA 2024 workplan further dedicated a total of €347 million under the EU FAB network to maintain rapid-response vaccine production capacities and strengthen EU biomanufacturing capabilities^[109]. Whereas these initiatives have the potential to “drive a comprehensive European BioPower agenda”, a more comprehensive approach is required in order to address the deficiencies of the EU’s “fragmented” biomanufacturing and venture capital ecosystem^[110].

Transmission suppressing technologies

Highly infectious pathogens will likely always outpace the ability to develop and distribute medical countermeasures. The WHO started daily reporting on the infection rates of COVID-19 on January 20th, 2020^[115]. 100 days later, on April 20th, 1.4 million cases and 135 thousand deaths had already been confirmed in the European region^[116]. The omicron variant, which led to a further spike in infections, was first reported to the WHO from South Africa on the 24th of November 2021 and was quickly classified as a “variant of concern”^[117]. 47 days later, on January 10th 2022, the new variant had already infected tens of millions of people – and global COVID-19 infection rates spiked to reach anywhere between between 63 and 107 million daily infections^[118].

Medical countermeasures like vaccines cannot plausibly be developed, manufactured, and distributed in a time frame fast enough to single-handedly curb the spread of a highly transmissible pathogen^[119]. Therefore, even if the world is successful in achieving the 100-days mission, non-medical means of transmission suppression will continue to play a vital role in our pandemic response.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, European states relied on social restrictions in order to contain the spread of the virus – like lockdowns and social distancing. While important to protect public health, these measures are not optimal, because they rely on public compliance in order to be effective and incur substantial economic losses by disrupting economic activity – in addition to significant political controversy and social disruption^[120]. Utilising transmission suppression technologies can lessen our reliance on social policies and enable ways of suppressing transmission more effectively and at a lower cost.

Transmission suppressing technologies can both improve our ability to limit the spread of infectious pathogens and reduce our reliance on costly social policies as our primary measure against infection. By slowing down and preventing the spread of airborne pathogens, these technologies can also help maintain the functionality of essential public spaces and services during a crisis. Their utilization therefore supports the EU’s ability to “function under all circumstances” – including in the event of an extreme biological event – as emphasised by the Niinistö report^[121].

The three technologies we consider to this effect are far-UVC lamps, elastomeric respirators, and glycol vapours. Here we examine each of them in turn, illustrating how they each contribute to a multi-layered approach to suppressing pathogen transmission.

Far-UVC lamps

Far-UVC light has significant potential as a highly effective and non-intrusive measure. Far-UVC lamps are silent, energy-efficient, and capable of continuous air disinfection without disturbing daily life^[122]. As such, they can complement existing measures used today such as HEPA air filtration systems.

Multiple studies have shown that far-UVC light can be a highly effective airborne pathogen disinfectant. Even at a very low dose of 2 mJ/cm2 and below, it can inactivate more than 95% of H1N1 influenza (Swine Flu) in the air^[123]. If this level of pathogen suppression can be replicated outside of lab settings, far-UVC lamps can become a highly effective biosecurity measure. If installed widely in high traffic or high risk indoor spaces, they could significantly suppress the spread of airborne pathogens, reducing the lethality of diseases and reducing our reliance on social policies for pathogen suppression^[124].

Far-UVC lamps can further lessen the economic burden of endemic communicable diseases which incur losses in the order of €6-14 billion on the European economy annually^[125]. Employers, especially within industries where working from home is not an option, will find significant economic incentives to install far-UVC lamps in offices and factories when the technology becomes more broadly available.

However, the current market for far-UVC lamps is currently negligible because their high unit price – north of €1,000 – makes them commercially unviable^[126]. This presents the EU with an opportunity to capture a leading position in a market with considerable potential worldwide, and drive down costs by means of focused R&D investment designed to enable manufacturing at scale. Our conservative estimate for a scaled far-UVC lamp industry indicates a €625 million annual market when implemented in the EU alone, assuming R&D investment and market incentives to scale production^[127].

There is also a need for further research into the safety and real-world efficacy of far-UVC lamps in order to satisfy the necessarily high standards of regulatory bodies. Far-UVC lamps may one day become ubiquitous in society as a preventative measure or reserved for in high-risk areas only. They cannot yet be rolled out at scale, however, because the current legal exposure limits are likely too low – and further research is required in order to build the required certainty of the short and long-term effects of far-UVC light exposure. Safety studies conducted over the past decade, however, indicate that far-UVC light delivered at 2 mJ/cm2 – a dosage found to be highly effective for air disinfection – falls far below the intensity at which UV light is harmful to humans^[128].

Elastomeric respirators

During the COVID-19 pandemic, a critical vulnerability emerged in Europe and globally due to inadequate access to high-quality personal protective equipment (PPE). Even though disposable respirators with FFP2 filters eventually became widely available, their real-world effectiveness was often limited by poor fit and imperfect use. While FFP2 filters are effective in principle^[129], loose respirators often in the form of surgical masks, often fall short of lab-tested performance, because they don’t seal tightly, leaving both the wearer and others vulnerable to exposure^[130].

The impact of suboptimal PPE was somewhat mitigated during the COVID-19 pandemic due to its relatively low mortality rate among healthy adults – <1% below age 64, and <0.1% below age 44^[131]. Consequently, critical workers were generally willing and able to continue their duties despite PPE limitations, moderating the overall health and economic repercussions.

However, some influenza strains such as H5N1^[132] and historical pandemics like the Spanish Flu^[133] have significantly higher mortality rates, and can be disproportionately lethal to younger segments of the population. A pandemic outbreak with these characteristics poses a much greater risk of fatalities and workforce attrition, and the potential of widespread inability or unwillingness of vital workers to go to work for fear of exposing themselves or their families to a highly lethal pathogen.

Elastomeric respirators address this deficiency by providing improved and consistent protection by ensuring a tight fit around the nose and mouth of the wearer. Recent research underscores their efficacy, demonstrating markedly better performance than disposable respirators in realistic healthcare environments^[134]. Because they are reusable, they also offer significant long-term cost savings and reliability^[135]. By producing and stockpiling them, Europe can better protect vital workers and maintain critical societal functions during the next respiratory pandemic – regardless of its severity.

Europe’s resilience against future respiratory pandemics would benefit significantly from investment in elastomeric respirators. There are approximately 50 million vital workers in the EU – defined as people performing vital societal functions in the form of healthcare, law enforcement, and energy and food production and delivery. Whereas it is difficult to estimate how many respirators would constitute sufficient and viable stockpiles of PPE^[136], because it depends on your definition of who is a vital worker and on the pandemic scenario you are preparing for. However, ensuring that at least half of the EU’s vital workers have ready access to respirators is a realistic and meaningful target, which can be critical for maintaining societal and economic stability in the event of a highly lethal respiratory pandemic. We estimate that the cost of equipping half of all critical workers in Europe with elastomeric respirators is around €1 billion – a fractional cost as compared to the economic damage it could help alleviate^[137].

Producing high-quality respirators domestically is strategically important, reducing the EU’s reliance on unreliable international supply chains in times of crisis. Local manufacturing also enables continuous innovation through research and development, rapid adaptation to user feedback, and scalable production tailored to diverse worker requirements, thereby assuring optimal fit, performance, and inclusivity depending on individual and industry-dependent requirements.

Glycol vapours

Glycol vapours could provide an additional, collective layer of defence against airborne pathogens in times of crisis. They can be used as a countermeasure in case of pandemics or bio-attacks by continuously disinfecting indoor air in high-traffic areas and along critical infrastructure like hospitals, manufacturing plants, and public transportation hubs, ensuring that critical societal functions can continue even in severe pandemic scenarios. They can be invaluable as a passive countermeasure, especially in situations where far-UVC lamps are insufficient and PPE cannot be worn or is inaccessible.

The disinfecting properties of glycol vapours have been known for a long time, with studies conducted in the US and UK as early as in the 1940s and early 1950s^[138]. However, interest and research funding into their applications in transmission suppression was deprioritised due to lack of early success and the concurrent development of modern antibiotics and vaccines^[139].

Glycol vapours appear to be safe for the eyes, skin, and lungs of healthy adults, and are already commonly used in a variety of foods, cosmetics, entertainment, and sanitation products, ranging from toothpaste to fog machines^[140]. At the concentration required for effective air-disinfection, they are tasteless, odorless, and invisible, and do not otherwise disturb human activities when deployed.

The production and deployment of glycol vapours is exceedingly cost-effective, as they are produced from abundantly available compounds like triethylene glycol and propylene glycol. It would cost only around €500 million to treat all of Europe’s industrial spaces with glycol vapours for one year^[141], and disinfecting one 100 square metre space continuously would cost roughly 40 cents per day^[142]. As such, the cost efficiency of glycol vapour makes it the low-hanging fruit of transmission suppressing technologies.

The EU is well positioned to become a leader in safe, large-scale implementation of glycol vapour as a mechanism to block transmission of pathogens, already having a strong position within the market for triethylene^[143], dipropylene^[144], and propylene^[145] glycols, and an existing manufacturing capacity for dispersion devices like vaporisers and nebulisers. However, more targeted research is needed – particularly on long-term safety for sensitive populations and best practices for real-world deployment in varied indoor settings, in order to build confidence around the safety and efficacy of their widespread implementation.

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Endnotes